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INTRODUCT I ON.
The Law of the Common Carrier covers an extensive
field in the world's jurisprudence. Springing up with
the dawn of civilization ; growing in importance as the
conditions of the race improved ; developing side by
side with the inventive genius of mankind ; ever expand-
ing as the commerce of the world increased ; abounding
in questions which no court has yet satisfactorily an-
swered ; it is a field teeming with interest to the stu-
dent of Law ,and pregnant with lessons for all thinking
men. The entire field of the Law of the Coinon Carrier
would be far too broad for the limits of a paper like
this and we shall confine our discussion to the consider-
ation of a single question, viz. : "The Liability of the
Common Carrier as an Insurer.' Moreover, since the gen-
eral rules governing carriage of goods by land and water
are essentially the saone, we shall, for the most part,.
limit our conclusionsto the liability attaching to the
carriage of goods by land.
THE LIABILITY OF THE COMON CARRIER AS INSURER.
I . Who are Connon Carriers ?
A conmon carrier has usually been defined as "one
who undertakes, for hire or reward, to transport the
goods, of such as choose to employ him, from place to
place." (Parker, J., in Dwight v. Brewster, 1 Pick. 50
11 An. Dec. 133.) But Judge Story says, that to bring
a person within the description of a common carrier, he
must exercise it as a public employment. 'He must un-
dertake to carry goods for all persons generally, and
he must hold himself out as ready to engage in the trans-
portation of goods for hire as a business, and not as a
casual occupation. Savage, C. J., in Orange Bank v.
Brown, (3 Wend. 161) says, 'every person who undertakes,
for hire, to carry the goods of all persons indifferent-
ly, is, .as o liability imposed, a coimmon carrier.'
Since it is with this element of liability)that we have
to do in our further discussion, it may be well at the
outs et~to ascertain by what criterion the courts deter-
mine who are comon carriers and subject to the excep-
tional liability imposed on that class, and who are only
private carriers and, as such, liable only for ordinary
care.
It is not always an easy question to determine wheth-
er a person in a particular case has so held himself out
to the world, by his professions or course of dealing, as
to constitute him a conon carrier rather than a private
carrier for hire. "The usual criterion", says H-utchin-
son in his work on Carriers, "is that he has held himself
out as being ready and willing, for hire, to carry par-
ticular classes of goods, for all who desire transporta-
tion of such goods, to or from the places between which
he professes, in this way, his readiness and willingness
to carry.'
But Nesbit, J., in an early case in Georgia, held
that "the obligation of law to carry is essential to
constitute the vocation of the common carrier, and the
liability to an action for a refusal to carry is, per-
haps, the safest criterion of the character of the car-
rier.' (Fish v. Chapman, 2 Ga. 349.)
The courts very generally accepted this standard
set up by Judge Nesbit, and it has become one of the
elementary principles of the law of carriers. (Citizens
Bakv. Nantucket Steamboat Co., 2 Story, 17 ; Satterlee
v. Groat, 1 Wend. 272 ; Dwight v. Brewster, 1 Pick. 50 ;
Riley v. Home, 5 Bing. 217 ; Fish v. Clarke, 49 N. Y.
122 ; Sarnnis v. Stewart, 20 Ohio, 69.)
It was not a new rule of law however, being known
in England in the days of Chancellor Kent, (2 Kent Com.
599) and some American courts have heldthat this test
was not so applicable in this country of changing condit-
ions/ as it was in hide-bound England. A leading case
so holding is Gordon v. Hutchinson (37 Am. Dec. 464),
the facts in which case were these : A farmer occasional-
ly did carting for merchants. It was not his regular
or usual occupation. He did not hold himself out as
ready to do carting, for all persons indifferently. He
solicited from specific merchants this employment. Some
goods being lost while in his possession, he was sued for
negligence, it being alleged that he was a com-non car-
rier. And the court held that he was a coirnon carrier,
although neither the "holding out" test nor the "obligation
of law to carry" were present in the case. And this
seems also to have been the law of South Carolina.
(Mc-trv. Hanond, 1 Am. Dec. 598.)
Wide apart as the terminal points in the pendulum's
arc, are the decisions of the courts on this important
question. But this disagreement, although most incon-
venient, need not discourage us in our efforts to find
some haven of safety in which to cast our anchor and rest
secure, since in no department of our jurisprudence are
the courts agreed in their decisions of cases involving
substantially the same essential facts, emust frame a
definition which shall include all the essential charac-
teristics involved in the leading cases,- excluding so
far as may be the non-essentials,- and then in our prac-
tice square the particular case to this specific stand-
ard, and stand or fall by the result.
Such a definition seems to be this : that "a conon
carrier is one who by virtue of his calling undertakes,
for hire, to transport persons or personal property, from
one place to another, for all who choose to employ him."
Ij. The Common Carrier an Insurer.
Having now a criterion by which we may generally
determine who is a common carrier, we may pass to the
inquiry : What are his liabilities, while acting in that
capacity, for loss of or injury to goods ? Here we find
in the earlier cases, a unanimity of opinion that is
somewhat startling, because not found in any other branch
of jurisprudence where interests of like importance are
at stake. "He is an insurer", say the courts of Eng-
land, with one accord, 'and liable for all loss or in-
jury to goods, except such as may be caused by the act
of God or of the public enemy." "He is an insurer",
echo the courts of our own land, "except as affected by
the act of God or of the public enemy, or the misconduct
of the consignor.'
We may well pause, to consider the source and jus-
tice of such severity, when we remember the distinguish-
ed services rendered to the cause of progress and civi-
lization by the common carrier in the recent past. The
plow would stand still in the furrow; the wheels of man-
ufacture cease their busy whirling; the hum of indus-
try run out to stillness'and the hands of labor be pal-
sied should the coinnon carriers throughout the world
lay down their burdens and retire their employment from
the industries of the race. After the first steps from
barbarism had been taken by mankind, the entire develop-
ment of civilization depended on the efficiency of this
branch of human industry. Along the arteries of trade,-
art, science and culture,- with all that that word im-
plies,- warmed into life and budded into beauty ; drew
from those arteries the essentials to their existence and
development; and owe to them the rich and varied fruit-
age that has fallen to bless and elevate the human race.
The whistle of the locomotive sounds amid the solitudes
of the West and, as by magic, the plains are dotted with
peasant homes ; waving grains supplant luxuriant wild-
growth, and rumbling wheels bear eastward the ripened
fruitage,to feed the contented artisan who labors by the
Sea. Debt beyond measure, is that which civilization
owes to the comon carriers of the past.
Let us trace now the line of treatment which they
have received at the hands of the public, as administered
by its agents, the courts of law. Prior to the founda-
tion of the Roman Empire, the carrier was unknown to
the administrators of law. Nothing worthy of co ment
can be found in the civil law of Rome touching carriage
by land, although the class of bailment to which this
belongs, viz. "locatio om is mercium _ven da", was
well known to the Romans.
Our first glimpse of the comon carrier in English
history reveals a horseman, lightly laden with parcels,
money and letters, whose chief peril was that of being
set upon by thieves and robbed in some lonely place.
(Encyc. Britt., Carriers.) And even down to the time
of Elizabeth, inland transportation, on its most exten-
sive scale was by strings of horses. (Encyc. Britt.)
Then came the rude wagon, and in the latter part of the
eighteenth century the comfortable stage coach, which
had long been known in and about London, began to rat-
tle through the quiet inland vales. But up to that
time,the inland roads of England were beset by highway-
men, and so great was the danger of collusion between
them and the carriers /that in the time of Elizabeth the
King's Bench decided that, 'a carrier implicitly under-
taketh the safe delivery of goods delivered to him, and
therefore he shall answer for the value of them if he be
robbed of them.' (2 Co. Litt. 89.) So, too, Lord
Holt, in Queen Anne's reign, pronounced that famous o-
pinion, which has been so closely followed even down to
our own day,-- 'The law charges this person, thus en-
trusted to carry goods, against all events, except the
act of God or of the enemies of the King. For though
a multitude should rob him, nevertheless he is charge-
able.' (Coggs v. Bernard, 2 Ld. Raym. 909.)
This exposition of the carrier's common-law liabil-
ity was sturdily maintained in England down to a recent
date. Transplanted to the American Colonies and taking
deep root, the sane doctrine has prevailed in the United
Statesiurts, and judges, because of its reverend age,
have blindly done it honor. The reason for the rule
as given by Lord Holt, in the case above cited, was 'pub-
lic policy.' Not by reason of his hire ; not by rea-
son of his contract ; not by reason of his employment;
but because of his opportunity to "undo all persons with
whom he had to deal, by collusion with thieves.' Sad
comment on the integrity of early England . For oppor-
tunity must go hand-in-hand with inclination or evil
never results. And yet under this standard the courts
of England and of the United States have rallied for
centuries, although the suspicion, even, of collusion
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with thieves has not been whispered in our own land for
more than half a century. No more ground for suspect-
ing collusion exists to-day, so far as the public car-
rier is concerned, than lurks behind the doors of every
mercantile enterprise.
But without entering at this point into the ethics
of this rule of law, we will proceed to examine, in the
light of actual cases, its practical workings, and the
limitations thereto) allowed by custom and the decisions
of the courts.
It may here be statedthat although at coinron law,
the carrier was allowed to discriminate between customer;
he was not allowed to refuse the goods or wares of any
one, of such sort as he ordinarily carried. Nor was he
allowed to charge an unreasonably high tariff. But he
was permittedto carry for whom he chose,at an unreason-
ably low rate, which was practically the right of dis-
crimination. Still he might not afford one customer
better facilities than another ; and he certainly could
not give to any one a monopoly of the carriage facili-
ties. (McDuffee v. Portland . Qo. , 52 N. H. 430
Messenger v. Penn. B-. i. Co., 37 N. J. L. 531.) And
injunction is sometimes granted to prevent discriination.
(Western h!. R. v. Sutton, L. R. 4 H. of L. 226.) And
in the United States the custoner can to-day compel
acceptance of proper goods by mandamus. (28 Hun, 543
68 Pa. St. 370 ; 55 Ill. 95 ; 27 Fed. R. 529.) But
the carrier may, in case of mob violence, refuse to ac-
cept goods, even though the mob consist of former em-
ployes out on a strike. (102 N. Y. 563 ; 13 S. W. 191.)
And he may decline to accept beyond capacity to carry
safely (99 Mass. 508) ; or goods of a different kind than
those he customarily carries (6 Wend. 335 ; 4 Excheq.
367) ; or where the goods offered are dangerous, or un-
fit for transportation. (107 Mass. 568.)
IlL. When does Liability Begin ?
But goods not within the above restrictions the
carrier was bound to accept, when offered him for imme-
diate transportation, together with the regular tariff
or hire. And upon acceptance his liability as connon
carrier arose, if nothing further remained to be done
by the consignor. And the liability continued the same,
though the property remained in the warehouse of the
carrier and was not loaded for transit. (Griffith v.
Ladue, 25 N. Y. 367 ; Coyle v. Western .i., 47 Barb.
But if anything remains to be done by the consignor
before the goods are ready for transportation, though it
be no more than attaching an addressed tag ; or if any
orders, directions or instructions were to be given be-
fore the goods were to be forwarded, the liability of
insurer does not attach. (R. R. Co. v. B, 36 Ohio,
453.) Or if a receipt is to be taken before delivery
is completed. (Gilbert v. N. Y. Cent . R.., 4 Hun, 380)
It was held in a case in 39 N. Y., 37, that a package
received outside the office did not make the carrier
liable. Same holding in 20 Ct., 354. But if a car-
rier's authorized agent comes to a man's residence or
place of business for the goods, he is liable. (Phillips
v. Egr, 8 Pick. 182.) And in 106 N. Y., 215, it was
held that a carrier may become liable before goods come
into his possession. Finch, J. goes even further, in
Bank of Batavia v. R. -R. C o. (106 N. Y. 195), and holds
that a carrier can become liable for goods never deliv-
ered,-- as where a bill of lading is made out and ne-
gotiated to an innocent third party. But this extreme
doctrine is not sustained by the U. S. Supreme Court.
(See 130 U. S. 416.)
From a cursory glance at the foregoing cases one
would be led to think that the rule of acceptance was
the caprice of the court. But a closer investigation
reveals the fact that local usuages and customs play a
very important part in the determination of nearly every
case.
This, at least, seems settled law : That when the
customer presents, for immediate transportation, only
such goods as the carrier holds himself out as willing
and ready to carry ; has the goods properly packed (and,
in certain cases, acquaints the carrier in some way of
facts, not patent on inspection which would increase the
usual risks of transportation) ; does not deceive as to
the true nature of the contents of the package ; yields
up possession and i,,nediate control of the property to
the carrier, the liability of an insurer arises, and
continues until delivered to the consignee, subject only
to certain limitations which we will next proceed to ex-
amine.
IV. Limitations of Liability.
1.-- Act of God.
Act of God has been defined to be "such inevitable
accident as cannot be prevented by human care, skill
and foresight ; but results from natural causes, such as
lightning and tempest, floods and inundations". (McHenry
v. Phila. L. BR. Qo., 4 Hun, 449.) But it is evident
that there might be an inevitable accident which no hu-
man skill or foresight could prevent,- as a collision in
a fog at sea,- which would still not be an act of God.
Judge Wright says, "An act of God denotes a natural ac-
cident which could not happen by the intervention of man.
It excludes all human agency. Moreover, to excuse a
common carrier, the act of God must be the immediate
and not the remote cause of the loss." (Meritt v. Earle
29 N. Y. 117. Also Michaels v. 14. Y. Cent,,R_. R. 30
N. Y. 571.)
We may conclude, then, that loss or injury attribu-
table,- while the carrier pursues his line of duty,- to
lightning, tempest, earthquake, flood or sudden death,
relieve the carrier absolutely from liability. Damage
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caused by rain, snow, freezing and similar natural agents
may ordinarily be foreseen and guarded against by prudent
men ; yet, under certain circumstances, losses resulting
from those causes are regarded as acts of God, and as
such excuse the carrier.
But losses due to natural decay, deterioration, and
waste of things carried, are always excusable. So, too,
where meats taint, oranges rot, peaches decay or butter
grows stale, the loss is due to the inherent character
of the property and it is regarded as resulting from the
act of God.
2.-- Act of the Public Enemy.
A public enemy, as referring to the undertaking of
a co non carrier, applies to foreign nations with whom
there is open war, and to pirates, who are considered at
war with all mankind. It does not include thieves, rob-
bers, rioters or insurgents, whatever their violence, or
native Indians. (Southern x. Co. v. Womack, 1 Heisk,
269 ; State v. Moore, 74 Mo. 418 ; League v. Rojan, 59
Texas, 434.)
3.-- Act of the Consignor.
This is a cause for exemption now thoroughly recog-
nized, though apparently unknown to the early writers on
this subject. Briefly stated, whenever the consignor
has occasioned or procured the loss complained of, the
carrier is excused from liability therefor. (Choate v.
Sowinshield, 3 Cliff. 184.)
So, too, if there be some hidden defect in the pack-
ing, and damages ensue, it is deemed the act of the con-
signor, and the carrier is absolved from liability.
(Cougar v. Chica go . ., 24 Wis. 157 ; Stimson v. Jack-
son, 58 N. H. 138.)
V. Special Contracts.
Such, then, was the liability of the carrier, down
to a comparatively recent date, as defined by the courts
of law. Compelled to accept and compelled to carry.
Forced to stagger on under a burden of responsibility
such as no other industry was forced to carry, and yet
leading the van of progress. An infant Hercules, slum-
bering upon his rights, while the twin serpents Conserva-
tism and Injustice wind their stifling coils around him.
Or better perhaps, a sturdy youth of mighty frame, uncons-
cious of the marvellous powers latent within him, plod-
ding patiently on )though hampered at every stepby the
swaddling clothes of his babyhood.
But this condition of things could not continue for-
ever. The old carrier dozed upon his box one muggy
sun er's day, and dozing dreamed) that the quivering
flanks of his jaded steeds grew steady and firm as steel.
A tireless vigor and resistless power coursed suddenly
through their veins. Their shaking manes seemed clouds
of smoke, and steam from their nostrils poured. The
wagon-ruts, stretching toward the horizon far, gleamed
like lines of polished steel. Their flying feet seemed
circling wheels, as with noiseless stroke they sped over
the shining way. His lumbering coach a palace seemed,
resting on cushions of air. The carrier woke and rub-
bed his eyes. There were the same jaded steeds, with
quivering flanks; the dusty road; the jolting coach. It
was all a dream. But he told that dream to his infant
son, and ere that son to manhood grew it had material-
ized, and the iron horse, with tireless feet and resist-
less power, had supplanted the carrier's panting steeds.
A new era was at hand !
With the introduction of steam as a motive power,
it became manifest that something must be done to relieve
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the carrier, or only a limited benefit would accruewhere
wide-spread advantages might be gained, and the question
arosewhether the carrier might not by special contract)
stipulate for further exemptions than those allowed by
the fixed rules of law.
It was not,-in England at least-a new question.
Long before, it had troubled the courts in that land.
Lord Coke and Sir Matthew Hale had already intimated that
such stipulations would be valid. (Southcodes Case,
4 Co. 89.(n.) ; Mars v. Slue, 1 Vent. 190 .) Lord Ken-
yon and Lord Mansfield also emphasized this view.
(Anonymous v. Jackson, Peake's Add. Cas. 185 ; Hide v.
T. 1 Co., I Esp. 36.) And at the beginning of
the nineteenth century this opinion was well settled
throughout England, and the carriers did~by special con-
tracts,free themselves from various other risks than
those allowed under the exemptions before enumerated.
This was a movement in the right direction, and yet the
courts expressed regret that Parliament had lent the
color of its sanction to such contracts ' (Nicholson v.
Willan, 5 East. 507.)
As a mighty ocean steamer anchored in the Mersey,
swings helplessly around at the turn of the tide, so the
English courts, answering to the mighty undercurrent
of popular demand, ocillated from the position )that
'public policy' should govern the liability of the car-
rier, to the opposite one~that the particular contract
should govern the bailment transaction, and he be lia-
ble only for fraud, misconduct or gross negligence, when-
ever by special contractthe consignor waived his ancient
rights. (Anon. v. Jackson, supra.)
This change was completed in 1830 by the so called
Carriers' Act, and by 1850 it was as definitely settled
that by a proper notice to his customer, the carrier
might stipulate for entire exemption from legal liability.
(Hinton v. Dibbin, 2 Q. B. 649 ; C v. Lancashire RL. i.
7 Ex. 707.)
This was a changeas radicaljas its former position
had been unjust, and, of course, not unattended with evil
results. Railroad corporations, under the impetus of
increasing foreign traffic, were rapidly growing in
wealth and power. The "opportunity" came now to the
"wool sacks', and if one may be permitted to judge by the
decisions rendered about this time, the inclination to
profit thereby was present also. Even Parliament be-
came alarmed at the favoritism shown, and in 1854 pas-
sed the so called Railway and Canal Traffic Act, with
the intent to neutralize if possible the policy of the
courts, and make the carrier liable,in all cases) for neg-
lect or default of the company or its servants. In
some cases the courts allowed this Act some weight. In
others it was utterly ignored, (Wise_ v. Great West. .. J.,
1 H. & N. 63 ; McManus v. iancah i. JJ., 4 H. & N.
327) and no one to-day, can definitely state ,what is the
exact position~of the common carrier in England. This
much is clear, however, that a perfect revolution of
feeling has taken place, and the sympathies of the courts
are now wholly with the carrier.
This same question had to be met by the American
courts, although the agitation began at a somewhat later
date than in England. But the struggle was not less
severe, and the pressure brought to bear, measured by
the moneyed interests of the carriers and the keenness
of their advocates, was infinitely greater than in Eng-
land. 'And yet", says Schouler, "we find no judicial
eccentricity manifested by the courts, in dealing with
the rights of companies organized for the carriage of
freight, that the legislatures felt called upon to cor-
rect.' There was no radical swing from east to west
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upon the subject. With a judicial calmness worthy of
the mighty interests involved, and a consistency which
commands the respect of all thinking men, they proceeded
to adjust the ancient rules to the changed conditions
of modern trade.
State Courts were generally conservative and, until
the adjudication by the U. S. Supreme Court in the case
of the New Jersey Seamship Co. v. Merchants' Bank (6
How. 344), were loth to commit themselves to a new and
untried policy. But that decision practically settled
all local controversies, and its doctrine was fairly
accepted as conclusive, 'that the carrier's right to
qualify his risks to a reasonable extent, under fitting
circumstances, was an undeniable one."
No other American writer has made a more thorough
and exhaustive study of this subject of special contracts
than Judge Redfield, so widely known through his "Collec-
tion of Railroad Cases", and instead of quoting from the
utterances of the various courtsjas we hitherto have
done,-in order to reach a conclusion, let us examine his
propositions,reached after years of research, and draw
our conclusion from them.
'It being clearly established", he says,"that corn-
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mon carriers have public duties which they are bound to
discharge impartially, we must concludethat they cannot
by special contractrelease themselves from the perform-
ance of these duties, even by the consent of those who
employ them. From a careful study of the entire field,
I have arrived at the following conclusions :
(A) A common carrier cannot lawfully stipulate for
exemption from responsibility when such exemption is not
just md reasonable in the eyes of the law.
(B) That it is not just or reasonable, in the eyes
of the law, to stipulate for exemption from negligence
of himself and servants.
(C) That these rules apply both to carriers of
goods and carriers of persons, and with special force to
the latter class."
3 think we may accept that doctrine as fairly set-
tled, and the case ,in which the American courts would
protect a carrier from the results of his own negligence,
must be a very exceptional one,--- although we would not
say that such a case could not arise.
In this hurrying age, time would not permit the
haggling over terms between customer and carrier. Some
speedier way had to be provided which, meeting the ap-
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proval of an intelligent publicand securing the sanc-
tion of the law, would be equally fair and binding. So
the coimon canier, by means of notices conspicuously
posted in -rh . places of business;or othervise brought
to the attention of the customer, was allowed to state
the conditions~under which he was willing to carry spe-
cific goods. A customer who, with a knowledge of these
published conditions,-- which knowledge was sometimes
implied by law,-- delivered to the carrier goods of the
kind described, was held to have assented to the condit-
ions, and the contract was complete and binding on him.
But the Courts of the United States have watched with
jealous eyes the practical workings of this rule of im-
plied offer and acceptance. Their sympathies have all
been on the side of the consignor, and every attempt to
overreach or coerce the customer has been met by a sting-
ing and effective rebuke. They have allowed the car-
rier to stipulate by conditions printed on "Bills of
Lading",'Way-Billsw and 'Receipts", but such printed con-
ditions, in order to release the carrier, must have been
delivered to the consignor before the bailment was com-
pleted. (Doles v. ee, N. J. Sup. Ct., 40 A. L. J. 383.)
So it may be seen that in a very limited way the
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cononon carrier in the United States, may extend by special
contract the exemptions allowed at comon law. But
no striking change in public sentimentlooking toward the
relief of the carrier is apparent from the position of
our courts.
I. When does Liability Cease ?
With the act of acceptance on the part of the car-
rier.a broad departure was made from the general rules
of bailment liability ; but when the work of transport-
ing is completed, the old bailment rules once more ap-
ply, and the carrier's liability ceases )as soon as he
has delivered the property entrusted to him over to the
designated party at the end of his route, in pursuance
of the terms of his undertaking. When goods are not
accepted by the consignee, the carrier must put them in
a place of safety ; and when he has done so he is no
longer liable on his contract of affreightment. (Richard
son v. Uoddard, 23 How. 28.)
The English rule is that the carrier is bound to de-
liver goods to the consignee, provided the latter appear
within reasonable time to receive them, and until such
reasonable time has expired he cannot deliver them over
to himself or another as warehouseman. (Gatliffe v. Bon-
nie, 4 Bing. N. C. 314.) This rule was adopted in 5
Wallace, 481, and may be said to prevail generally in
the United States to-day. (Sherman v. Hudson BiR.E. Co.,
64 N. Y. 2,54 ; Moses v. Boston R. R. Co., 32 N. H. 523 ;
Wood v. Crocker, 18 Wis. 345 ; Onnuit v. Henshaw, 35 Vt.
605 ; Kidd v. Ala. R. R. Co. 35 Ala. 209 ; Graves v.
Hartford Steamboat Co. 38 Conn. 143 ; McMillan v. Iich-
2gnR. R. Co., 16 Mich. 79 ; Maignon v. New Or. R. Co.,
24 La. 333.)
It may be added )that where the carrier is to forward
goods over anothdi- line, the simple duty remains to no-
tify the connecting carrier of their arrival ) and deliver
over to him within a reasonable time. With the deliv-
ery of the property to the consignee, the warehouseman
or the connecting carrier, his liability ceases.
Concluding Remarks.
Such, then, has been the liability of the con on
carrier, from the time when the courts first summoned him
to appear before them,down to the present day. An in-
surer of goods against accident or loss, excepting such
as resulted from the act of God or of the public enemy.
To these, modern jurisprudence has added the 'wrongful
acts of the consignor" and "stipulations by special con-
tract." But these exceptions only lighten the burden
to a very limited extent. Even the 'stipulations by
special contract" has been so hedged in by the courts,
that its practical workings are a nullity, speaking in
a general way. And yet the needed relief must come in
this way if it come at all.
There can be little doubt that at the time it was
imposed, the burden of insurance was a salutary measure.
It was a needed check on the spirit of brigandage which
then prevailed. But conditions have changed. That
spirit has passed away, and one of sterling honesty has
taken its place. A high standard of morality rules to-
day in conercial centers Beading the list of direc-
tors )of every great carrying corporationjare names sym-
bolic of integrity,-- a standing guaranteethat customers
will be justly dealt with. May it not well be question-
ed whether in retaining this rule of indemnity, after
the ground that gave it origin had long passed away,
the American courtshave subserved the best interests of
the public ? Untrammelled right to limit liability
in the carriage of ordinary goodsmeans cheaper freight
rates, and consequently lower prices. And that, too,
without lessening the profits of the producers or the
middlemen. And it does not follow~that a train of evils
resulting from negligence of the carrier would immediate-
ly accrue. That there is an unwarranted hostility to
moneyed corporations in the minds of the working classes
no one will question. It naturally follows that when
an accident or loss occurs, whether with or without the
carrier's fault or negligence, the jurycomposed of work-
ing menwill in every caseimulct the corporation through
unconscionable damages. The presumption is against the
carrier, always ; the burden of proof to show absence of
negligence rests on him ; while he confronts a prejudiced
jury. Is it any wonder, then, that money seeks other
and less exacting fields in which to serve its owner ?
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What results ? One line of rails, where two would oth-
erwise have been. One corporation to dictate terms and
collect high freights, instead of competing corporations
and the consequent reduction of tariff. Now, with com-
peting lines, does any one doubt that scrupulous care
would be exercised~and losses be reduced to a minimum ?
How else could custom be obtained and held ? Does
not this principle invariably hold in other industries ?
Why, then, shall it not be equally applicable to the car-
riage of freight ? If it be said that in sparsely set-
tled districtscompeting lines cannot be maintained, we
reply that it is the duty of the courts and legislatures
to promote the genera good ; that with a swelling native
population, and an increasing tide of immigration, sparse-
ly settled districts shall not exist, even in this great
land, in a future not widely remote.
To-day,it is claimedthat carrier and consignor do
not stand on equal grounds ; that the former unduly co-
erces the latter ; that were it not for this rule of
law, the minister would become our master. Are we not
standing the pyramid upon its apex ? If there be any
force whatever in the claim, is not the "minister become
the master' because of this very rule of law, which
frightening away capital, limits the extension of car-
rying facilities, and thereby shuts out competition ?
We should cut quite to the line Ibefore we decide where
the right rests in this matter. Let us not forget, that
what the circulatory system is to our natural bodies, the
facilities of carriage are to the bodies politic. Let
circulation become sluggish and defective, and our bodies
decline and die. Let the arteries of trade be unduly
constricted, and civilization halts ; progress ceases;
and a decline sets in. Inventive genius, for want of a
field in which to flourish, droops and dies. We should
remember, not alone the massive profits of the carrier ;
but the iirmeasurable debt we owe him for comforts already
ours. We should mete out to him the justice long de-
served, and receive the greater blessings which he can
secure.
Where human lives are at stake )the case is different..
Then let the carrier be held to a rigid observance of the
utmost care and diligence known to prudent men. If
through accident, which might by the exercise of the
highest diligence have been prevented, human life or
limbs be lost, let the courts by heavy damages visit up-
on the carrier its condemnation, since the lives of its
citizens belong not to themselves alone, but to their
country also. But in matters where personal property
alone is involved, with which each may do as best pleases
himself, let greater freedom be allowed. Give to car-
rier and consignor the absolute freedom of contract al-
lowed in other industries. Then let our courts, when
their aid is invoked, sympathizing with neither, render
to each impartial justice.

